SignalGate: The Illusion of Privacy in a Surveillance State

Summary

• Recent Pentagon Incident: In March 2025, top Trump officials accidentally added a journalist to a Signal group chat discussing military strikes, exposing sensitive operational details and forcing the Pentagon to issue warnings about Signal’s vulnerabilities.
• Not Fully Open Source: While Signal is commonly believed to be entirely open source, its anti-spam system remains closed source. Though this component serves the legitimate purpose of preventing spam, it creates a potential vulnerability point that cannot be independently audited.
• Concerning Leadership Ties: Signal’s leadership and board have deep connections to establishment institutions, raising questions about the organization’s true allegiances. Following the money reveals ties to mainstream tech companies, government advisory roles, and elite institutions that typically support surveillance capabilities.
• Technical Limitations: Signal’s encryption protocols, while better than standard messaging, aren’t as innovative or secure as marketed. Recent acknowledgments of vulnerabilities and the Pentagon’s warnings about Russian hackers targeting the app reveal its limitations.
• OS-Level Vulnerability: Even with perfect encryption, any messaging app running on BigTech operating systems (iOS, Android, Windows) remains fundamentally vulnerable since these platforms can access everything you see and hear, rendering the encryption essentially moot.
• Viable Alternatives: Privacy-focused alternatives like Session (getsession.org) offer decentralized, anonymous messaging without requiring phone numbers, though Matrix/Element requires server setup that limits its accessibility for average users.

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If you’ve used Signal Messenger in the last few years, you’ve undoubtedly heard the privacy claims: “End-to-end encryption that just works,” “Privacy isn’t an optional mode,” and “There are no ads, no affiliate marketers, and no tracking.” These bold statements adorn Signal’s website and marketing materials, painting a picture of the ultimate secure communications platform – a fortress against both corporate and government surveillance.

The messaging is clear: while other messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram, and traditional SMS are vulnerable to snooping, Signal positions itself as the gold standard for privacy – the sanctuary where your communications remain truly private. This narrative has been amplified by endorsements from privacy advocates like Edward Snowden and has become the default recommendation from security professionals worldwide.

It’s a compelling story. So compelling, in fact, that Signal has grown to over 100 million users, including journalists, activists, politicians, and even government officials who handle sensitive information. This perception has become so ingrained that many users genuinely believe their Signal messages are fundamentally more secure than any alternative.

But as we peel back the onion, we find this narrative is built on a foundation with significant cracks that at very least we believe people should be aware of.

The Pentagon Group Chat Fiasco: A Stunning Wake-Up Call

The recent controversy surrounding Trump administration officials has opened a window into the disconnect between Signal’s privacy rhetoric and the reality of how it’s used by those who should know better.

On March 11, 2025, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz created a Signal group chat titled “Houthi PC small group” that included 18 senior Trump administration officials to discuss an imminent U.S. military strike against Houthi rebels in Yemen. The participants included Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, and other top security officials – including an unnamed CIA officer.

In what can only be described as a catastrophic security breach, Waltz inadvertently added Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, to this highly sensitive conversation. According to reports, Goldberg observed detailed discussions about strike timing, weapons to be used, and targeting sequence – information many security experts maintain should have been classified.

The fallout was immediate. On March 18, just one week after the chat was created and days after Goldberg alerted officials to his presence, the Pentagon issued a department-wide advisory warning that “Russian professional hacking groups are employing the ‘linked devices’ features to spy on encrypted conversations” in Signal. The memo explicitly stated that third-party messaging apps like Signal “are NOT approved to process or store nonpublic unclassified information.”

This incident reveals several disturbing realities:

1. Even the highest levels of government – people with access to the most secure communications systems in the world – trust Signal for discussions that should be classified
2. The Pentagon was already aware of vulnerabilities in Signal but only issued warnings after a public embarrassment
3. Signal’s touted privacy features didn’t prevent an unauthorized person from being added to a highly sensitive conversation

What’s the most common reason for things going wrong in tech? USER ERROR.

Hence, my humble belief is that the Chief of Staff for Waltz simply made a fat thumb mistake and added the wrong person to the group chat. We’ve all been on threads before when someone, even maybe yourself, should NOT have been on the thread and eventually responds, “who are you? Please remove me from this thread! You’re blowing my phone up and wasting my time!”

In that this whole incident has raised the spotlight on Signal and forced people such as myself to do some digging, I’m glad it happened.

The Technical Reality Behind Signal’s Privacy Claims

Beyond this high-profile incident lies the technical reality of how Signal actually functions. While Signal has implemented genuine privacy features, a deeper examination reveals that their overall approach to privacy is far more complex than their marketing suggests.

The Closed-Source Anti-Spam System: A Necessary Evil or Concerning Vulnerability?

Signal’s messaging protocol and client apps (Android, iOS, desktop) are open-source and subject to regular security audits. However, there’s a critical component that isn’t: Signal’s anti-spam system.

To be fair, Signal’s justification for keeping this component closed-source is legitimate – preventing spammers from studying and circumventing it makes practical sense. The amount of data this specific component can theoretically access is also more limited than, for example, the core messaging infrastructure.

However, this closed-source element creates a blind spot that inherently weakens Signal’s security model and contradicts its promise of complete transparency. Without independent verification, users must simply trust Signal’s claims about what this system does and doesn’t do. When examining potential concerns, several scenarios emerge:

1. Metadata Collection: While likely limited in scope, the anti-spam system could still collect certain metadata (IP addresses, phone numbers, patterns of communication) and potentially retain it longer than communicated to users.
2. Account Flagging: The system could include mechanisms to flag specific accounts for additional monitoring or data collection, possibly at the request of government agencies. Since this component isn’t subject to public scrutiny, there’s no way to verify what criteria might trigger such flagging.
3. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: Even if the anti-spam system itself doesn’t have malicious intent, its closed nature means vulnerabilities might go undetected, potentially allowing sophisticated attackers to compromise it.

The recent Pentagon warning about Russian hackers exploiting Signal vulnerabilities demonstrates that even supposedly secure systems can have unexpected weak points. The fundamental question becomes: can a system be truly secure when parts of it remain hidden from independent security researchers?

Signal’s Encryption: More Vulnerable Than Advertised

Signal touts its protocols (Double Ratchet, AES-256, SHA-256) as “quantum resistant” cutting-edge technology. However, these are merely patched-together standards, not true innovations. Claims about “dissolving keys” (which supposedly disappear after use) and quantum resistance don’t hold up to scrutiny – these protocols are potentially more vulnerable than advertised.

The Pentagon’s recent advisory specifically warned about Russian hackers exploiting vulnerabilities in Signal. Signal’s VP Jun Harada acknowledged the attacks, stating they introduced “additional safeguards and in-app warnings to help protect people from falling victim to phishing attacks.” This admission reveals that Signal’s security isn’t as robust as its marketing suggests.

Furthermore, the closed-source anti-spam system creates a vulnerability point that could potentially compromise the entire security model. Without transparency, there’s no way to verify what this component is actually doing behind the scenes.

Signal Leadership: The Establishment Ties

A closer look at Signal’s leadership reveals troubling connections to establishment institutions and political ideologies:

Meredith Whittaker, Signal’s president, is a professor at NYU, faculty director for AI Now Institute, Chair of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and member of several influential think tanks. She was named by Time magazine (a Pilgrims Society publication) as “most influential in AI.”

Brian Acton, Signal’s chairman since 2018, co-founded WhatsApp and sold it to Facebook in 2014. He’s worked at major tech corporations including Apple and Yahoo, and is connected to numerous establishment figures. He’s a known AIPAC donor who recently purchased a $70 million French Riviera chateau once owned by Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky.

Matthew Rosenfeld (Moxie Marlinspike), Signal’s co-founder, has been relegated to “emeritus” status – effectively sidelined from his creation. A self-described anarchist who has criticized democracy, his Signal Protocol has been co-opted by the very Big Tech giants he claimed to distrust – WhatsApp, Google Messages, Facebook Messenger, and Skype all now use it.

The board includes additional members with deep establishment ties:

• Amba Kak: Rhodes Scholar (British Pilgrims Society), Oxford graduate, senior advisor to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and executive director of AI Now Institute (founded during Obama Administration)
• Jay Sullivan: Yale graduate, worked at Twitter, Facebook, Mozilla, Microsoft, and Oracle
• Katherine R. Maher: CEO of NPR, executive director of Wikimedia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations member, UNICEF officer, World Bank advisor, and connected to multiple NGOs funded by USAID and the British Pilgrims Society

This leadership structure raises serious questions about Signal’s true allegiances and priorities. Can an organization led by figures so deeply embedded in establishment institutions and ideologies truly be committed to challenging government surveillance and corporate data collection?

The Privacy Awakening: Recognizing Reality Over Marketing

Just as with other areas of our digital lives, many of us have been lulled into a false sense of security by clever marketing and comforting narratives. The illusion that our communications are truly private when using Signal is precisely that – an illusion. The evidence, when examined honestly, reveals an organization with deep establishment ties making calculated business decisions, not a privacy crusader.

This isn’t to say Signal is necessarily worse than alternatives – in some ways, it may indeed offer better privacy protections. But the gulf between its marketing claims and the reality of its implementation represents a significant disconnect that users deserve to understand.

When we examine the Pentagon incident alongside Signal’s technical vulnerabilities and leadership connections, a concerning picture emerges. If even the highest levels of national security can’t use Signal properly, and if the Pentagon itself warns against using it for sensitive information, can ordinary users really trust it for truly private communications?

Breaking Free: Steps Toward Actual Digital Privacy

If you’re concerned about genuine privacy protection, consider these steps:

While Still Using Signal:

• Verify security settings and enable disappearing messages
• Be extremely cautious about group chats – they’re particularly vulnerable
• Remember that Signal still collects some metadata, including phone numbers
• Regularly update to get security patches
• Be aware that your contacts’ security practices affect your own privacy
• Understand that simply because a service is encrypted, if the operating system or other apps on the device can see what you see and hear what you hear, this can render the encryption useless

Moving Beyond Signal:

Session (getsession.org): A more anonymous alternative that doesn’t require phone numbers and operates on a decentralized onion routing network. Built initially as a fork of Signal but now using its own Session Protocol, it removes the central server architecture that Signal depends on, eliminating many potential surveillance points. Session doesn’t collect metadata, requires no personal information for signup, and routes all messages through a distributed network rather than central servers. The app was audited by Quarkslab, confirming its security claims, and recently moved its jurisdiction to privacy-friendly Switzerland. While voice calls are currently in beta and use peer-to-peer networking (exposing your IP to call partners), Session’s focus on metadata protection makes it a compelling alternative for privacy-conscious users.

Matrix/Element: Offers fully open-source client and server code available for public audit. While technically superior for privacy in many ways, Matrix requires someone to set up and manage server infrastructure – a significant barrier for the 99.9% of users without technical expertise. For organizations with IT resources, this can be a viable option, but it’s not realistic for most individuals.

GrapheneOS: For those wanting a comprehensive privacy solution, pairing an alternative messaging app with a privacy-focused mobile OS like GrapheneOS creates a much stronger security posture than simply using Signal on standard Android or iOS. As mentioned above, this is because iOS, MacOS, Google Android, Chrome and Windows are all operating systems that constantly listen, watch and feed your information back to the companies that own and manage them along with various 3rd parties who sell and share your data. Using an encrypted messaging service may prevent someone in the middle of the conversation from deciphering a conversation, but if I can read and hear your conversation from the device itself, it renders the encryption used mute.

Remember that true security comes from proper operational security practices, not just tool selection. Even the best privacy tools can be compromised by poor security habits.

Conclusion: No More Illusions

The March 2025 Pentagon Signal fiasco should serve as a wake-up call for anyone who values true privacy. When top government officials with access to the most secure communications systems in the world choose Signal for sensitive discussions – and fail catastrophically – it reveals the dangerous gap between perception and reality in digital privacy.

Signal may be better than standard SMS or mainstream messaging apps, but its closed-source components, establishment-connected leadership, and technical vulnerabilities should give us pause. The almost religious belief in Signal’s privacy guarantees has created a dangerous complacency among users who need genuine security.

True privacy requires more than downloading an app with good marketing. It requires critical thinking, technical understanding, and a willingness to look beyond convenient narratives. Most importantly, it requires us to recognize that in today’s surveillance landscape, trust must be earned through complete transparency – something Signal, despite its claims, has yet to fully embrace.

We must also acknowledge a fundamental reality: no messaging app, regardless of its encryption quality, can protect your privacy if it’s running on an operating system designed to monitor you. Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android, and Microsoft’s Windows are fundamentally surveillance platforms that can access everything displayed on your screen and captured by your microphone. The most secure encryption in the world becomes virtually worthless when the operating system itself is the spy.

As we navigate an increasingly hostile digital landscape, let’s move beyond privacy theater and demand genuine protections built on verifiable, open standards – from the operating system up through the application layer. Our digital sovereignty depends on it.